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Abstract 
The study provides empirical analysis of the cross-country relationship between a direct measure of 
competitive conduct of banking system and financial system in CIS countries during the period from 
2001 to 2013. We determine the level of banking competition by using Panzar and Rosse H-statistic. 
Estimation results from Logit probability analysis reveal that the level of competition does not 
significantly affect the probability of banking crisis in such countries. However, a number of 
macroeconomic and institutional factors have a significant influence in financial stability. According to 
empirical results, higher inflation increases the probability of a banking crisis. On the other hand, credit 
growth decreases the probability of banking crisis in the investigated countries. These results are robust 
to the methodology when the interaction of concentration and h-statistic is used. The institutional factors 
have significant influence on preventing banking crises. Specifically, improvement in government 
effectiveness decreases the probability of banking crisis.  
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1. Introduction: 
Maintaining financial stability of the banking system is one of the main goals of the central banks. One 
of the factors affecting the stability of financial systems is the extent of competition. However, studies 
examining the effect of competition to the stability do not have a clear answer whether much 
competition is in favor of financial stability or not. From the point of view of researchers such as Marcus 
(1984), Charletti and Hatmann (2003), competition brings fragility to the financial system. They argue 
that more competition deteriorates market power, decreases profit margin and encourages banks to take 
more risks. However, recent literature argues for the opposite view, stating that much competition brings 
stability. Further, the availability of multiple data has enabled researchers to conduct tests for various 
groups of countries. Using cross-country data, Schaeck et al. (2006) and Boyd et al. (2006), found 
empirical evidence that more competitive banking systems have lower likelihoods of bank failure and 
longer time to crisis.   
Existing empirical investigations based on cross-country data do not include CIS countries as group, due 
to the lack of sufficient observations in the time they conducted the research. However, there is a need to 
find empirical evidence on relationship between a direct measure of banking competition and banking 
system fragility in CIS countries. CIS countries have similarities in their economies as they switched 
from socialist system to open market economy. Therefore, most of the banks entered to the market in the 
late 1990s and thereafter. . Over the time, banking industry is considered as the crucial component of 
financial system and the regulatory framework in these countries has evolved. The presence of foreign 
banks in the banking market of these countries has also increased, although there are still restrictions in 
some of the countries. On the other hand, government ownership of the banks still remains in some 
countries. In order to continue the structural development and reforms in the banking systems of these 
countries, it is important to determine the necessary extent of competition.  
Thus, this study raises important questions: How the extent of competition changed over time in the 
selected countries? Is more competition needed to achieve more stable banking system in such 
countries?  If not, which factors significantly affect financial stability in CIS countries? 
First, the study will determine the level of competition in CIS countries’ banking system over the period 
2001-2013. The next step will be examining the relationship between competition and financial stability 
of these countries simultaneously controlling for macroeconomic and institutional factors. This study 
will contribute to the existing literature by adding empirical evidence in the direction of the relationship 
between competition and financial stability in studied countries. Furthermore, the research uses the most 
recent data for multiple countries to include the recent trends in the banking system. Last, but not least, 
the study will consider additional regulatory variables not included in the previous literature.  
 
2. Previous Literature 
The literature that is used for this study can be categorized in two parts. First, we will review the 
literature devoted to measurement of banking competition in individual and multiple countries. Later, 
the literature investigating the relationship between competition and financial stability will be discussed.  
Measurement of banking competition 
The main approaches used to investigate banking competition are structural and non-structural 
approaches. Structural approach applies concentration ratios or indexes (such as Herfindahl-Hirschman 
index) to determine competitive trends in banking market.  It is based on Structure-Conduct-
Performance paradigm (SCP) which has originally been developed by Mason (1939) and Bain (1951). 
SCP implies one-way causal relationship in the following sequence: from industry structure to firm 
conduct, and from firm conduct to industry performance. As a result, SCP tries to infer the degree of 
competition of an industry from its structural features. According to their results, high level of 
concentration in banking industry damages competition and causes market collision. However, 
Claessens and Leaven (2004) and Schaeck et al. (2006), show that competition may be considered as a 
property of conduct rather than structure.  
To overcome this problem, non-structural measures are used in the measurement of banking 
competition. According to this approach, behavior of banks is the main indicator in determining their 
market power. The models used are derived from bank’s optimization behavior.  Such techniques have 
been widely used in relevant literature to determine the extent of market competition. Two non-
structural models, PR (Panzar and Rosse) and Bresnahan-Lou technique are used for the purpose of 
measuring banking competition. Their description and use in previous studies are discussed below.  
Rosse and Panzar (1977), Panzar and Rosse (1982) and Panzar and Rosse (1987) employed revenue test 
to determine the extent of banking competition. Their method infers about competitive behavior of 
banking subjects from the comparative static properties of reduced-form revenue equation which uses 
firm-level data (Gischer and Stiele, 2009). Under this model, the level of competition is measured by an 
indicator, which is called H-statistic6. This study will provide more comprehensive information about H-
statistic and its calculation in the methodology section. Schaeck, Chiak and Wolfe (2007) claim the 
superiority of using H-statistic over previously used methods by formal derivation of this indicator from 
profit maximizing equilibrium conditions. They explain that another advantage of using this measure is 
its robustness with respect to the market, as H-statistic is calculated based on the characteristics of 
reduced form revenue equations at the firm level.  
Bikker and Haf (2002) studied the relationship between market structure and degree of competition in 23 
industrialized European and non-European countries during the period from 1988 to 1998.   They used 
Panzar-Rosse (PR) approach to determine the extent of competition in selected countries. Their study 
revealed that there was a strong evidence for monopolistic competition in all examined countries. 
However, there was perfect competition among large banks in some countries. Furthermore, the extent 
of competition among large and international banks was much stronger than small and local banks. A 
similar study was conducted by Delis (2010) for a different time period. He studied competitive 
conditions in Central and Eastern European countries over the period 1999-2006.The paper found a wide 
variation over the different banking systems. Some of them were described as having significant market 
power while others are closer to monopolistically competitive banking systems. The study also 
described the importance of structural and macroeconomic environment in banks’ revenue generation.  
Furthermore, some of the previous studies investigated specific countries. Hamza (2011) estimated PR 
model to study market structure in banking industry in Tunisia and determine the level of competition. 
By using Panel dataset of Tunisian banks for the period from 1999 to 2008, the author found that the 
banks in Tunisia earned their revenue in the condition of monopolistic competition. They also conducted 
equilibrium test for the Tunisian banking market and confirmed that Tunisian banking market was in 
equilibrium.   
Park (2011) also used Panzar and Rosse model to test for the effect of market concentration on banking 
competition in the Korean and Chinese commercial banking markets for the period 1992-2008.  
According to his results, the increased concentration has not reduced competition in Korea. There was a 
monopolistic competition for the entire sample in Korean banking market. On the other hand, decreased 
                                                          
6  The derivation of the statistics is provided in the methodology section 
market concentration has improved the banking competition moderately in China. Chinese banking 
market was near to oligopoly over the research period. 
An alternative technique to measure competition was developed by Bresnahan (1982) and Lau (1982). 
They show that oligopoly solution concept can be estimated econometrically. They explained the degree 
of market power by rotating the demand curve around the equilibrium point. They stated that if pricing 
was competitive, rotations would not have effect on the equilibrium. The logic behind this thechnique is 
that, in competitive markets marginal cost equals to price, whereas in monopolistic markets marginal 
cost will be equal to perceived marginal revenue of uncompetitive market. Shaffer (2001) used 
Bresnahan-Lau technique to determine market power and excess capacity in 15 industrialized countries. 
He explained his choice of Bresnahan-Lau technique over PR methodology with a number of reasons. 
He argued that PR required samples should be in long-run equilibrium while Bresnahan-Lau had a better 
ability of the estimated conduct parameter to provide a broader picture of specific oligopoly solution 
concepts. This concept implies a theoretical basis for a systemic association between market structure 
and pricing conduct. Shaffer (2001) investigated the competition and the need for the Single Banking 
License in the selected European nations. The results supported a need for the Single Banking License in 
the selected European countries as some of these countries were found to experience limited degree of 
banking market power before the European single banking license.   
Some researchers tested for the relationship of banking competition and other factors. There is a view 
that power in banking may positively affect access to finance. According to Petersen and Rajan, (1995), 
young firms get better access to finance in concentrated markets, as banks are able to smooth interest 
rates over the life cycle of firms. They compensate lower interest rates charged to the young firms by 
higher interest rates charged to older firms. Thus, they are able keep interest rates at the level where 
moral hazard is not a problem for financing young firms. However, in economy where there are 
relatively few young firms and the markets are well established concentrated markets will have a 
distortionary effect on access to finance. 
While discussing interest margin determinants, Fungáčová and Poghosyan (2011) showed that foreign 
bank entry could contribute to the improvement of the competitive environment in the country. They 
argued that this factor helped to reduce the cost of financial intermediation. This result was also obtained 
by Barajas et al. (2000) which state that improvement in market competition and enhanced banking 
sector efficiencies in the case of Columbia led to lower interest margins and better financial information.   
Relationship between competition and financial stability 
 
Interest in examining the relationship between competition and the financial stability was initiated by 
Keeley (1990). He introduced “competition-fragility” approach claiming that increased competition in 
US banking system eroded financial stability in 1980s. He explained that presence of many banks in the 
banking system may lead to the excessive risk taking by the banks. The reason for this was that, more 
risky loan applications also received financing in case of competitive market. Besanko and Thakor 
(1993) also argue that banks choose more risky portfolios when competition toughens. On the other 
hand, banks hold back from risky behavior in the presense of well-strctured risk-based deposit insurance 
scheme (Cordella and Yeyati,1998; Matutes and Vives, 2000).  
The proponents of “competition-stability” approach claim that financial stability may be damaged by 
increasing market power. Mishkin (1996) argued that concentrated banking systems generally had fewer 
banks, thus create conditions for excessive risk taking of “too big to fail” banks. In addition, Caminal 
and Matutes (2002) showed that banks in a monopolistic market tend to create more risky loans and 
therefore default probability of those loans rises. In the same vein, Nagaraja and Sealey (1995) argue 
that forbearing regulatory policies are contributing for banks’ asset quality to deteriorate. Perotti and 
Suarez (2002) demonstrate that even though banks may fail due to fierce competition, in competitive 
market conditions banks will behave more prudently due their incentive to become an acquirer rather 
than a target in a takeover.  Boyd and De Nicolò (2005) showed that there is no trade-off between 
competition and stability, as an increase in competition may lower interest rates, positively affecting 
banks’ portfolio quality. 
Some papers support different elements of both “competition-fragility” and “competition-stability” 
views. According to the results of the study conducted by Berger et al. (2008), market power increases 
loan portfolio risk which is consistent with “competition-stability” view. On the other hand, their results 
also support “competition-fragility” view, as banks with a higher degree of market power also have less 
overall risk exposure because increased loan portfolio risk may be offset in part by higher equity capital 
ratios.  
Until recently, the literature was available for a single country studies or the comparison of two 
countries. However, the availability of large-datasets for multiple countries enables us to conduct 
research for multiple countries to determine the relationship between bank competition and stability for 
multiple countries with similarities in their economies. Schaeck et al. (2006) studied different groups of 
countries over the period 1980 to 2003 and found a positive relationship between bank stability and bank 
competition by using PR methodology to determine the level of competition. In addition, they found that 
time to crisis was longer in more competitive banking systems. Schaeck, Cihak and Wolfe (2007) 
conducted a study for 2600 European banks and found that capital ratios were higher in more 
competitive environments. Beck et al. (2006 a,b) considered some country specific factors in their study. 
They determined that banking systems with more barriers to bank entry were more likely to suffer 
banking distress.  
Another research conducted by Claessens and Laeven (2004) estimated competitiveness indicators for a 
large cross-section of countries (mainly developed and emerging countries, for the list of countries, 
please refer to page 573 of the study). They found a positive relationship between foreign bank presence 
in the banking system and banking competition. Following this logic, fewer activity restrictions for 
foreign banks led to more competitive banking systems. They did not find statistically significant 
relationship between banking system concentration and competition. However, the results showed that 
more concentrated baking systems were more competitive. They supported the idea that contestability 
was a determining factor for competition rather than structure.  
To sum up, the existing literature discusses the relationship between “competition-fragility” and 
“competition-stability” view. While the first approach claims that more competition damages the 
stability, the proponents of the second view provide empirical evidence that more competition may 
contribute to the stability of the banking systems. At the same time, by using cross country data and 
empirical methodologies, studies show that different country specific factors should be considered. 
Therefore, the influence of competition to financial stability may be different due to country specific 
factors and institutional environment.  
This study intends to enrich the literature by investigating whether more competitive banking systems 
are more stable in transition countries of former Soviet Union, using the most recent data. At the same 
time, additional control variables specific to transition countries will be added to avoid the bias in the 
results for transition countries.  
Further research may be conducted to optimize the necessary level of competition (by using H-statistic) 
for ensuring financial stability (by using crisis dummies). In addition we intend to extend the research to 
investigate the optimal form of entry and participation of foreign ownership in the banking sector of the 
selected countries.  
 
 
 
  
 
3. Data and Summary Statistics 
 
The study includes 7 post-soviet (CIS) countries during the period of 2001-2013. Some CIS countries 
are excluded due to lack of sufficient data. Descriptive statistics for the entire set of variables is provided 
in table 1. Appendix to the paper presents detailed explanation of the variables and their definitions. 
Macroeconomic and institutional variables are obtained from Worldbank database. The source of bank 
specific variables is BvDBankscope Financials. We made necessary adjustments to imported data. First, 
all duplicate rows have been deleted in order to avoid double-processing of data. Second, we excluded 
the data of Central Banks, bank holding companies and non-bank financial institutions as it does not 
match with our research interests. In addition, we made all necessary corrections to unreasonably large 
values for the variables due to reporting errors. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
  Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev.  
Concentration 0.58 0.57 0.88 0.33 0.13 
Credit Growth 0.31 0.27 0.98 -0.10 0.24 
GDP Growth 7.02 7.10 34.50 -14.80 6.61 
Inflation  9.37 7.00 61.10 -1.10 11.09 
H-statistic 0.60 0.61 0.98 0.11 0.20 
M2/Total Reserves 2.08 1.89 5.89 0.80 0.94 
Political Stability 40.48 38.35 83.65 7.69 20.32 
Rule_of_Law_Rank 37.30 35.31 73.93 4.90 19.64 
Gov. Effectiveness  41.08 40.67 76.59 9.76 19.96 
Terms of Trade 131.12 111.60 250.00 87.10 44.97 
 
Concentration measures the proportion of assets (%) held by three largest institutions in a country, averaged over the 
sampling period of 2001-2013. Credit Growth is the real growth rate of domestic credit to private sector. GDP Growth is 
the rate of real growth of the Gross Domestic Product. Inflation is the rate of the change of the GDP deflator. H-statistic is a 
measure of competitiveness in the financial services industry. M2/Total reserves measures the ratio of Money and Quasi 
money to Total reserves. Terms of Trade is the change in net barter terms of trade. Political Stability reflects perceptions of 
the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means. 
Rule_of_Law_Rank reflects perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society. 
Government effectiveness reflects perceptions of the quality of governance.  
We also use a dummy variable that takes on the value of one if a systemic banking crisis surfaced in the 
particular year of observation or zero otherwise. Episodes of systemic banking crisis are determined in 
accordance with the definitions by Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2005). We follow the criteria that 
non-preforming loans have to reach 10 percent of gross loans to classify a country as having a banking 
crisis. Following this classification, 19 banking crisis episodes were recorded between 2001 and 2013 
that can be utilized for the logit model. The list of banking crises is provided in table 2.  
Table 2: Banking Sector Crises 
Country The periods with NPLs higher than 10% 
Azerbaijan 2001-2004 
 
Kazakistan 2002, 2009-2013**  
Belarus 2001-2002  
Armenia 2001-2002  
Lithuania 2009-2013  
Georgia 2001  
Russia 2009  
Source: WorldBank Database 
Note: ** No data available for 2001 in Kazakhstan per WorldBank Database 
 
 
4. Methodology 
As a summary of the analysis on the methods used in previous literature, this study prefers PR H-
statistic to measure the extent of market competition. To overcome the problem mentioned in the use of 
PR methodology, we have also tested for equilibrium in the market to avoid a downward bias in the 
results. 
The Panzar-Rosse Model 
The extent of banking competition will be determined over the research period. For this purpose, the 
empirical test, which is based on comparative static characteristics of reduced-form log-linear revenue 
equation, formulated by Rosse and Panzar (1977), Panzar and Rosse (1982) and Panzar and Rosse 
(1987) will be applied. According to this empirical test, the sum of elasticities of gross revenues with 
respect to each input price, which is denoted by H, is determined from the following equation:  
R’i(xi, n, zi) – C’ i(xi, wi, ti) = 0         (1)   
R’i and C’i stand for marginal revenues and costs. xi refers to the output of bank, n to number of banks, 
zi to exogenous regressors of bank’s revenue function, ti to exogenous regressors of  bank’s cost 
function, wi to the vector of k factor input prices. i denotes the relevant indicator of bank i.  
Considering all factors mentioned above, for this study, Panzar and Rosse model is written as following:  
 
               
(2) 
Here, IRit is the ratio of interest revenue to total assets for bank i at time t, “labor” is the unit price of 
labor, “cap” is capital cost, “fund” is cost of funding, “assets” is the volume of total assets, “loanr” is the 
ratio of total loans over total assets, “cusdep” is the ratio of customer deposits in total deposits and short 
term funding. All variables will be taken in natural logarithms to improve goodness of fit and avoid 
potential simultaneity bias. µi and µt refers to the vector of selected banks and time-distinct dummies. 
These variables help to consider fixed effects within the data. Equation (a) will be estimated by using 
GLS with time dummies. After estimation of parameters, H-statistic will be calculated as a sum of 
elasticities of revenue by price of input factor, which is expressed by following equation: 
H = β1 + β2 + β3  (3) 
According to Panzar-Rosse model, competitive environment in the banking system is determined due to 
the values of H-statistic: 
H ≤ 0, monopoly in the banking system 
0 <H< 1, monopolistic competition 
H = 1, Perfect competition or natural monopoly in a perfectly contestable market 
The observations are tested for long-run equilibrium following Delis (2010) which is a critical feature of 
H-statistic. It is justified on the ground that competitive banking markets will equalize risk-adjusted rate 
of return across banks to make sure that the rate of return should not be statistically correlated with input 
prices. In order to do this, equation (a) is run with an alternative variable- return on assets is used as 
dependent variable. In this case the equation (a) takes the following form: 
 
                     
(4) 
After running this equation, H-statistic for equation (4) is calculated in similar way: 
He = β1 + β2 + β3  (5) 
In this case, He=0 means that the observations are in long-run equilibrium.  
Logistic Probability Analysis 
In order to determine the probability of a systemic banking crisis in the banking markets, logistic 
probability model will be applied following Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2005) and Schaeck et al 
(2006). In each period, a country is either experiencing a crisis or not. The probability that a crisis will 
occur at a particular time in a particular country is assumed to be a function of n explanatory variables  
X (i,t). The explanatory variables in this model will be discussed below. We denote a dummy variable as 
P (i,t), it takes the value of one when a banking crisis occurs in country i and time t and a value of zero 
otherwise.  is a vector of unknown coefficients and F( ’X(i,t)) is the cumulative probability 
distribution function evaluated at ’X(i,t).  Therefore, the log-likelihood function of model is: 
 
Here, P(i,t) is the dependent variable that equals one if crisis occurred or zero otherwise, β denotes a 
factor of n unknown coefficients, and F(β’X(i,t) denotes the cumulative probability distribution function 
evaluated at β’ X(i,t). X(i,t) refers to the explanatory variables, i refers to country and t to time. 
Following Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2005), Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2006) and 
Schaeck et al. (2006), we will use following explanatory variables: “ competition, measured by “H-
statistic”, concentration”, GDP growth, inflation, M2 to total reserves, credit growth, rule of law, 
political stability, “government effectiveness. To control for nonlinear relationship we also include the 
interaction of competition and concentration. Definitions of these variables refer to those used in the 
study held by Schaeck et al. (2006). Furthermore, this study will add rule of law and regulatory quality 
from world governance indicators of World Bank as explanatory variables. 
5. Results 
5.1 Panzar and Rosse Estimation 
Average H-statistic is provided for the studied countries in table 3. We confirm that banking markets are 
in equilibrium by following Delis (2010).  Using data for the period 2001-2013, we compute H-statistic 
by including all commercial, savings and co-operative banks across a sample of 7 countries included in 
this study. Table 3 shows that all countries have a monopolistic competition. Summary statistic shows 
that the results do not deviate significantly over time. The next question of interest is how the 
monopolistic competition affected financial stability in these countries.  
 
Table 3. Average H-statistic for CIS countries 
Country H-statistic Median Maximum  Minimum St. Dev 
Azerbaijan 0.57 0.57 0.81 0.35 0.16 
Armenia 0.44 0.48 0.66 0.11 0.18 
Belarus 0.70 0.74 0.87 0.50 0.11 
Georgia 0.60 0.67 0.91 0.11 0.28 
Kazakstan 0.59 0.58 0.85 0.35 0.16 
Lithuania 0.81 0.82 0.98 0.62 0.10 
Russia 0.55 0.57 0.74 0.38 0.11 
H-statistic (H) for each country in the sample using the Panzar and Rosse method. 
 5.2 Logit estimation results 
According to the results, indicators that significantly affect financial stability are credit growth rate, 
inflation and institutional factors. Results from table 1 indicate that inflation increases the probability 
of a banking crisis significantly at the 10 percent significance level. This is consistent with academic 
literature, which argues that high inflation is used as an early warning indicator of a banking crisis. 
Credit growth decreases the probability of a banking crisis in studied countries, which is statistically 
significant at 1 percent level. This might be explained by the fact that banking system has improved in 
dealing with credit portfolio over time, as the CIS counties were establishing their banking system from 
zero after the Soviet Union collapsed. Alternatively, this may be explained with the fact that dependent 
variable is an NPL dummy taking value one when the ratio of Non-performing loans (NPL) to total 
loans exceeds 10%.  If the credit growth  exceeds the NPL growth, the share of NPL in total loans will 
decrease. It should be mentioned that we have taken into account the possibility of the newly created 
loans becoming overdue in the next period by re-running regression with the second lag of credit growth 
in specification 3. As results of specification 3 in the table 4 shows the sign of coefficient for credit 
growth is still negative leading us to conclude that high credit growth has been accompanied with 
improvement in loan underwriting standards in observed countries. 
In addition, decrease of government effectiveness increases the probability of a banking crisis. 
Surprisingly, improvement in rule of law rank leads to a banking crisis according to the results. This can 
be explained with the fact that, as the rule of law rank improves, more non-performing loans are 
recognized in accordance with appropriate standards. 
Moreover, the variables mentioned above are also significant when the level of concentration is 
controlled for. We include the interaction term between banking competition and concentration due to 
possible spurious correlation between the two. Similar to previous specification, both indicators are not 
significant in this estimation either. Similar to specification 1, Inflation enters with positive sign at 10 
percent significant level in specification 2. Credit growth is also significant at 5 percent significance 
level in second specification. Government effectiveness and rule of law rank are also significant at 10 
percent significance level. Results are also robust to crisis period as the estimation is performed with the 
dummies for the crisis years. We agree that there may be some bias in the results as there were many 
inappropriate and missing values in the data for selected countries from Bankscope and Worldbank 
database. However, we did our best to make necessary corrections to data before importing it to the 
model. We believe that our main results hold as they are consistent with relevant literature.  
Table 4: Logit probability analysis 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Constant 
-1.90 2.08 1.25 
(-0.68) (0.29) (0.38) 
H-statistic 
1.94 -4.98 2.02 
 (0.85)  (-0.44) (0.67) 
M2 to toal reserves 
0.20 0.17 0.91 
(0.33) (0.30) (1.17) 
GDP Growth  
0.02 0.01 -0.10 
(0.24) (0.11) (-1.03) 
Inflation  
0,07 0.07 0.02 
(1.81)* (1.86)* (0.29) 
Concentration 
-1.41 
(-0.42) 
-9.09 
(-0.70) 
-8.34 
(-1.49) 
Credit Growth  
-5.85 -5.67 -3.95 
     (-2.63)*** (-2.50)** (-1.70)* 
Government Effectiveness 
-0.05 -0.05 -0.07 
(-1.59)* (-1.43)* (-1.74)* 
Political Stability  
-0.02 -0.02 -0.07 
(-0.51) (-0.46) (-1.06) 
Rule of Law Rank 
0.08 0.08 0.14 
(1.76)* (1.78)* (1.94)** 
H-statistic*Concentration 
 
12.32 
(0.62) 
 
Observations 70.00 70  
Number of crises 14.00 14  
Akaike Info Criterion  1.05 1.07  
McFadden R^2 0.24 0.24  
 
We estimate logit model for the period 2001-2013 in CIS countries. The dependent variable in the logit models is a dummy 
variable that equals one if a crisis observed or zero otherwise. All explanatory variables in the model are lagged one period to 
avoid simultaneity problems. Significant levels of 1, 5 and 10 percent are indicated by ***, ** and *.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
6. Conclusion 
We investigated the influence of banking competition on financial stability by using Panzar and Rosse 
methodology and logistic probability analysis. We analyzed data on banking statistics, macroeconomic 
and institutional variables from CIS countries. Our results show that there is no statistically significant 
relationship between banking competition and financial stability in selected countries. Instead, 
estimation results show that macroeconomic and institutional indicators are more significant to banking 
system stability.  
Inflation is a precursor for banking system failures. Moreover, credit growth has positively affected the 
financial stability as the banking systems in these countries have gained some experience since they 
switched from planned to market economies. From the institutional indicators, government effectiveness 
positively affects banking system stability. The paper also controlled for the degree of concentration to 
check if likelihood of a system crisis changes. The results did not change significantly. Therefore, results 
are consistent with previous literature that competition and concentration are different from each other.  
There is a need to improve institutional environment in such countries. To do this, all banks should be 
treated equally and avoided from special treatment that may damage transparency in banking markets. 
Also, regulations and the communication of policy makers have to be transparent and in timely manner 
for proper intermediation of the banking systems.  
Future studies are expected to investigate further the effect of foreign ownership on financial stability 
and to determine preferred structure of bank ownership. The motivation for such a study is that some of 
CIS countries have barriers for entries to the banking system and high government ownership. 
Furthermore, other methods of determining banking competition may be used to check if the results are 
the same.  Further researches may be conducted on the effect of globalization and consolidation trends in 
the banking systems to the banking fragility of such countries.  
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 APPENDIX A 
Definitions of Variables and Data Sources 
Variable  Definition  Source 
H-statistic 
Variable that captures the competitiveness of the banking 
industry whereby H ≤ 0 indicates monopoly equilibrium; 0 < 
H <1 indicates monopolistic competition and H = 1 indicates 
perfect competition 
Claessens and Laeven (2004)  
Crisis (Dependent 
variable) 
Dependent variable is a dummy that takes on the value of one 
if a systemic banking crisis surfaced in the particular year of 
observation or zero otherwise. Episodes of systemic banking 
crisis is determined in accordance with the definitions by 
Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2005) 
World Bank Indicators, Demirgüc-Kunt 
and Detragiache (2005) 
GDP growth (real) Rate of growth of the gross domestic product  World Bank Development Indicators  
Inflation Rate of change of the GDP deflator World Bank Development Indicators  
Credit growth Growth rate of Net Domestic Credit World Bank Development Indicators  
Terms of trade Change in the net barter terms of trade World Bank Development Indicators  
Concentration Proportion of total assets held by the 3 largest institutions in a 
country, averaged over the period 1988–2003  
Schaeck et al. (2006) and 
bankscope 
Political Stability  
 
Reflects perceptions of the likelihood that the government 
will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or 
violent means, the indicator is percentile rank among all 
countries (ranges from 0 (lowest) to 100 (highest) rank). 
World Bank Worldwide Governance 
Indicators 
Rule_of_Law_Rank 
Reflects perceptions of the extent to which agents have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of society, the indicator 
is a percentile rank among all countries (ranges from 0 
(lowest) to 100 (highest) rank).  
World Bank Worldwide Governance 
Indicators 
Government 
effectiveness  
 
Reflects perceptions of the quality of public services, the 
quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence 
from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of the government's 
commitment to such policies. The indicator is  percentile rank 
among all countries (ranges from 0 (lowest) to 100 (highest) 
rank) 
World Bank Worldwide Governance 
Indicators 
IR Ratio of interest revenue to total assets  Bankscope 
Labor 
The unit price of labor, which is ratio of personal expenses to 
total assets 
Bankscope 
Capital cost 
Cost of capital, which is ratio of total non-interest expenses 
after personal expenses to total assets 
Bankscope 
Assets  Volume of total assets Bankscope 
Loan_r Ratio of total loans to total assets Bankscope 
Cost of funding Ratio of total interest expenses to total customer deposits Bankscope 
ROA Return on Assets Bankscope 
 
